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NOTES

WARNING: NEW JERSEY SUPREME
COURT HAS DETERMINED THAT
COMPLIANCE WITH THE FEDERAL
CIGARETTE LABELING AND
ADVERTISING ACT MAY BE
HAZARDOUS TO THE TOBACCO
INDUSTRY
In 1964, the United States Surgeon General released the first
report scientifically linking cigarette smoking to lung cancer,
bronchitis and emphysema.' In response,' some states adopted
' See SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE 1964). An
Advisory Committee, formed for the purpose of investigating the health related effects
concerning smoking, issued a 387 page report revealing a connection between cigarette
smoking and "lung cancer, .... chronic bronchopulmonary disease, .... laryngeal cancer,
emphysema, esophageal cancer, urinary bladder cancer, pulmonary emphysema, coronary
artery disease, peptic ulcers and low birthweight babies." Stein, Cigarette Products Liability
Law in Transition, 54 TENN. L. REV. 631, 643 (1987). See also Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
825 F.2d 620, 622 (1st Cir. 1987) (1964 Surgeon General Report was first official scientifically approved statement linking smoking to cancer, bronchitis and emphysema); Crist &
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cigarette packaging warning label requirements.' Given the potential for inconsistent state regulations, Congress passed the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act ("the Act") in 1965, in an
attempt to establish uniformity.4 The Act requires that all cigaMajoras, The "New" Wave in Smoking and Health Litigation - Is Anything Really So New?, 54
TENN. L. REV. 551, 557 (1987) (same). See generally Cigarette Smoking is a Health Hazard,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 20, 1964, at 87 (discussing possible effects of Surgeon General's Advisory
Committee Report).
3 See Palmer, 825 F.2d at 622 (public response to Surgeon General's report was immediate and vocal); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 1986) (members of federal and state government aware "cigarette smoking posed a significant health
threat to Americans"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987); Stein, supra note 1, at 643 (Surgeon General's report and dangerous effects of smoking highly publicized); Crist &
Majoras, supra note 1, at 557 (same).
3 See Palmer, 825 F.2d at 622. After the health hazards of cigarette smoking were revealed to the public, several states adopted warning label requirements in order to protect
and inform the citizens of their respective states. See id. "For example, the New York State
legislature adopted the following label in June 1965: 'WARNING: Excessive Use Is Dangerous To Health.'" Id. at 622 n.l (citing 1965 N.Y. Laws 470). See also Crist & Majoras,
supra note 1, at 560 (states proposed varied regulations thereby spurring congressional
involvement).
The warning label requirements created by the states were enacted against a background
of litigation resulting from claims that smoking caused illness and/or death. See Wegman,
Cigarettes and Health, 51 CORNELL L. REV. 678, 697-703 (1966). The 1950's and 1960's saw
the first wave of litigation "none of which was resolved adversely to the [tobacco] manufacturer." Crist & Majoras, supra note 1, at 552. Courts and juries were simply hostile toward
claims by smokers that others were responsible for their own choice to smoke. See id.
As late as 1986, one commentator stated that there was "little likelihood of waging a
successful civil action against a cigarette manufacturer for a smoking related illness." Note,
Liability of Cigarette Manufacturersfor Smoking Induced Illnesses and Death, 18 RUTGERS L.
REV. 165, 165 (1986). In fact, the record of defending such actions was impressive:
The tobacco industry proudly points to the fact that it has ne.ver paid a single dollar
to a plaintiff for a smoking-related illness, either as part of an out of court settlement
or as the result of a court ordered judgment. This phenomenal success rate is the
envy of other industries. No other major manufacturer can boast of such a blanket
immunity from litigation.
Id.
Subsequent to the first round of litigation, strict products liability theories were utilized
in an attempt to reverse the successful defense of cigarette based claims. See Crist &
Majoras, supra note 1, at 552. "[W]hat is new is the evolution of product liability law which
now provides more liberal theories of recovery." Id. (quoting Edell, Warnings To Cigarette
Manufacturers: This Litigation May Be Hazardousto Your Health, 1 PRODUCTS LIABILITY: COMMENTARY & CASES (Callahan & Co. 1984)). However, as one authority observed, "[gliven
the present dimensions of products liability law, the rule of nonliability will probably continue." Id. (citing Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1424-25 (1980)). The debate over state tort liability exists during a time
when Congress has not prohibited production, sales or consumption of tobacco products.
See Comment, The Liability of CigaretteManufacturersfor Lung Cancer:An Analysis of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act and Preemption of Strict Liability in Tort Against
CigaretteManufacturers, 76 Ky. L. J. 569, 574 (1987-88).
4 On July 27, 1965 Congress passed the Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (codified
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rette packages and advertisements bear a congressionally mandated warning label5 in order to inform the public about the
health hazards associated with smoking, while protecting commerce and the national economy through uniformity." The Act
preempts state law "with respect to the advertising or promotion
of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity
and amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1988)). See Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876
F.2d 414, 417 (5th Cir. 1989) (Act was response to awareness of smoking's health threat
and Congress' concern with protecting national economy); Palmer, 825 F.2d at 622 (Congress intended to strike balance between national health and commerce); Dewey v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 81, 577 A.2d 1239, 1244 (1990) (Congress set up
uniform warning label requirements to avoid "the potential maze of conflicting regulations'.); Note, The Effect Of Cipollone: Has the Tobacco Industry Lost its Impenetrable Shield?,
23 GEORGIA L. REv. 763, 768 (1989) (Congress enacted Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act in response to Surgeon General's report). See also H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2350, 2351. The
Surgeon General's Advisory Committee Report found that "[c]igarette smoking is a health.
hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action." Id.
' See 15 U.S.C.-§ 1333 (1988). In 1965, the Act required a conspicuous warning label be
placed on cigarette packages and in cigarette advertisements. This warning read: "CAUTION: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous To Your Health." Pub. L. No. 89-92, §2, 79
Stat. 282, (1965) as amended by Act of April 1, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-222, §2, 84 Stat. 88
(1970). In 1970, Congress amended this warning providing a more definitive statement:
"WARNING: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous To Your Health." Id. In 1984 Congress expanded the provision, requiring a choice of
four warnings to be rotated on a quarterly basis:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks To Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result In
Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoking Contains Carbon
Mononxide.
Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2201 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §1333 (1988)).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). The congressional declaration of policy and purpose
provides:
It is the policy of Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to establish a comprehensive Federal Program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect
to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby (1) the public may be adequately informed about any adverse health effects of
cigarette smoking by inclusion of warning notices on each package of cigarettes and
in each advertisement of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum
extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse,
nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health.
Id.

235

Journal of Legal Commentary

Vol. 6: 233, 1991

with the [Act's] provisions."'
While the regulation of health and safety traditionally has been
a state function, 8 federal legislation can preempt state law.9 Courts
disagree as to whether the Act preempts the state common law
tort of inadequate warning.1 0 A majority of the courts that have
15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988). This section, entitled "Preemption" provides:
(a) Additional statements
No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required
by section 1333 of this title, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) State regulations
No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed
under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.
Id.
' See U.S. CONST. amend. X, providing: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.". Id.
The police power of the states, especially when exercised in furtherance of public health
and safety, is traditionally a power reserved to the states under the Constitution. See Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985)
("health and safety matters ... primarily, and historically [are] a matter of local concern");
In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 554 (1890) (power concerning "conservation and promotion of
public health ... is a power originally and always belonging to the States .... "); Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 1986) (plaintiffis health related tort
action "concerns rights and remedies traditionally defined solely by state law"), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1043 (1987); United States v. Robinson, 106 F. Supp. 212, 218 (D.C.N.D. 1952)
(tenth amendment to Constitution leaves police powers to states); Kyte v. Philip Morris
Inc., 408 Mass. 162, 174, 556 N.E.2d 1025, 1031 (1990) (presumption against preventing
states from regulating matters of state concern); U.S.C.A., art. VI, cl. 2, n.144 (West 1990)
(police power of states should be respected); U.S.C.A., art. VI, cl.2, n.147 (West 1990)
(health and safety matters are historically of local concern); Edell & Walters, The Doctrine of
Implied Preemption in Products Liability Cases - Federalism in the Balance, 54 TENN. L. REV.
603, 604 (1987) (Supreme Court opinions preserve traditional state common law causes of
action including those involving safety).
' See infra notes 14-21 and accompanying text (discussion of preemption law).
10 See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 216 N.J. Super. 347, 353, 523 A.2d 712,
715 (1986) (conflict among federal district courts interpreting preemptive effect of Act on
state common law claims). Compare Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 582 (3d
Cir. 1990) (holding that plaintiff's state claim for failure to warn preempted by Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991) with Dewey v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 94, 577 A.2d 1239, 1251 (1990) (holding plaintiff's failure to warn claim was not preempted by Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act).
There have been similar inconsistencies on the federal level. Compare Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984) (Atomic Energy Act does not preempt state-authorized award of punitive damages for conduct related to radiation hazards yet conduct
related to safety aspects of nuclear power preempted) with International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987) (Clean Water Act preempts court from applying law of
affected state against out-of-state source).
In InternationalPaper, the Court found that although there was a savings clause in the
Clean Water Act preserving state common law remedies, the application of numerous state

236

Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
examined this issue have found preemption of the state common
law. 1 However, recently, in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the Act did not bar such
a claim.'
Part I of this Note will discuss the statutory construction of the
Act, reviewing both its language and legislative history. Part II
will examine how prior courts had been consistent in denying relief for a common law claim of inadequate warning, and discuss
the recent New Jersey decision in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. Part III will synthesize cases involving the areas of federal preemption which have been decided by New York courts in an attempt to predict the future viability of inadequate warning claims
under New York law. It will also serve to illustrate the kind of
preemption analysis facing plaintiff's attorneys throughout the
country. Finally, this Note will suggest that the analysis of the
Dewey court was faulty and that the decision will not necessarily
pave the way for future claims of inadequate warning under state
common law.
laws on a particular source would result in uncertainty, thereby undermining the Act's
goals of uniformity and efficiency. 479 U.S. at 496.
"Preemption often hinges 'on .. .question[s] of statutory construction and interpretation."' Dewey, 121 N.J. at 78, 577 A.2d at 1243 (citing Palmer v. Liggett Group, 825 F.2d
620, 623 (lst Cir. 1987)). As such, it is submitted that the interpretation of legislation by
different courts will necessarily vary as statutory interpretation involves an element of subjectivity. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (no "universal pattern to determine the meaning and purpose of every act of Congress").
For a general discussion of the inconsistent nature of statutory interpretation, see Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 407, 407 (1989) ("Because [statutory] interpretation inevitably involves the application of 'background norms'
- often controversial, value-laden, and not found in any text - the traditional theories
[explaining statutory interpretation] are incomplete.").
" See Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 1989) (failure to warn
claims preempted); Roysdon v..R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 232 (6th Cir.
1988) (same); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 621 (1st Cir. 1987) (same);
Stephen v. American Brands, Inc. 825 F.2d 312, 313 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (same); Cipollone,
789 F.2d at 187 (same), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987); Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. 1989) (same); Rogers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 557 N.E.2d 1045, 1050-51 (Ind.Ct. App. 1990) (same); Hite v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 578 A.2d 417, 419-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (same); Phillips v. R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990).
13 See id. at 94, 577 A.2d at 1251.
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

History of Preemption

Congress has the power, pursuant to the supremacy clause of
the United States Constitution,"' to enact federal legislation which
preempts state common and statutory law."0 Preemption occurs
when it is the express intent of Congress"6 or when it can be im-

plied that Congress intended to pervasively "occupy the field." 1
U.S. CONST., art VI, cl.2. The supremacy clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.

14

Id.
15 See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986) (supremacy clause
provides Congress with power to preempt state law); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De
La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982) (preemption doctrine rooted in supremacy clause);
Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981). "The
underlying rationale of the preemption doctrine, as stated more than a century and a half
ago, is that the Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that 'interfere with or are contrary
to, the laws of Congress .... .'" Id. (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 211
(1824)). See also Edell & Walters, supra note 8, at 605-13 (history of preemption); Note, The
Breadth of Section 514 of ERISA and the Preemptability of State Antisubrogation Laws, 5 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 29, 32-34 (1989) (same).
While the supremacy clause gives Congress the power to enact federal legislation that
preempts state law, "[c]onsideration under the Supremacy Clause starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law." Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
16 See Hillsborough County Fla. v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
713 (1985) (Congress empowered to displace state law by express terms); Fidelity Fed. Say.,
458 U.S. at 152-53 (preemption may be express or implied); Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (state laws must fall when Congress explicitly provides for preemption in pertinent statute); Crist & Majoras, supra note 1, at 568 (general discussion of
express preemption).
17 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). The Court proposed
several ways by which congressional intent to preempt state law may be inferred. d.
The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. Or the Act of
Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject. Likewise, the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose. Or the state policy
may produce a result inconsistent with the objectives of the federal statute.
Id. (citations omitted). See Hirsch, Toward A New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F.
515, 529 (when federal act is found to occupy particular field, Court has "regularly declared that the states are precluded from regulating that subject in any way"); Rothschild,
A Proposed "Tonic" With Florida Lime to Celebrate Our New Federalism: How to Deal With The
"Headache" Of Preemption, 38 U. MIAMI L. REv. 829, 844 (1984) (example of clear legislative
intent to preempt).
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The preemptive effect of a federal law may be triggered when the
state law at issue conflicts with the federal law. 8 The conflict must
be "actual" and not merely "hypothetical" or "potential."' 9 An
actual conflict is present when compliance with both laws is impossible,2 0 or when the state law stands as an obstacle to the federal
law's congressional purpose.2"
B.

Plain Meaning

The two stated purposes of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act provide for adequately informing the public of
the health hazards associated with smoking and protecting commerce and the national economy.2 2 Congress established national
warning label requirements for all cigarette packages and adverIs See Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 713 (state law nullified to extent it actually conflicts with
federal law); Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union Local 54,
468 U.S. 491, 501 (1984) (same); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978)
(same). See also Stein, supra note 1, at 643 n.161 (analysis of preemption doctrine as pertains to Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act); Comment, Common Law Claims
Challenging Adequacy of Cigarette Warnings Preempted Under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act Of 1965: Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 754, 755,
755 n.3 (1986) (discussion of actual conflict and preemption doctrine).
The Court, in Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977), points out that in order
to determine whether a federal law and state law are in actual conflict, consideration must
be given to the relationship "between state and federal laws as they are interpreted and
applied, not merely as they are written."Id. at 526.
" See infra notes 33 and 90.
20 See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). The
Court in Florida Lime found that "[a] holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce" Id. (citations omitted). See also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248
(1984) (actual conflict when impossible to comply with both federal and state law); Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
204 (1983) (same); Edell &.Walters, supra note 8, at 606 (discussing concepts of preemption); Note, supra note 15 (same).
"1 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). The Court acknowledges that there
is no distinct formula for determining congressional intent. See id. "[The Court's] primary
function is to determine whether, under the circumstances of ... [a] particular case ...
[the] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress" Id.; see, e.g., Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, Inc. v, Agricultural Mkt. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984). In Michigan Canners, because
the State of Michigan's Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act authorized producers'
associations to engage in conduct that the Federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967
forbids, the Court found it represented an obstacle to the Federal Act and was therefore
preempted. See id. at 478.
" See supra note 6 (congressional declaration of policy).
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tisements" and ensured uniformity of the warning labels by expressly preempting the field. 4 The Act's preemption provision
provides that no additional statements relating to smoking and
health shall be required on any cigarette package. 0 In addition,
the preemption provision specifically restricts state regulatory
power by providing that "[n]o requirement or prohibition based
on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with . . . [the Act]." ' 26
Congress' failure to define state law has caused a dispute as to
the breadth of the preemption provision.27 Historically, states
have maintained the right to regulate matters relating to the
health, safety and welfare of their citizens. 8 In order to prevent a
state from regulating in these areas, there must be a clear and
definite manifestation by Congress to preempt such regulations. 29
When determining whether Congress has preempted a state regulation, courts recognize a presumption against preemption. Arguably, "State law" is not a clear manifestation by Congress to
preempt both statutory and common law, and therefore, a court
23 See supra note 6 (Act's purpose). See also Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620,
622 (1st Cir. 1987) (Congress set up uniform, nationally consistent system of cigarette
warning labels to avoid conflicting state regulations); H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, reprinted in 1965 U.S. ConE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2350, 2352 (Act's legislative
history).
"' See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 83, 577 A.2d 1239, 1245-46
(1990). "Although Congress clearly intended to occupy a field, as evidenced in both the
preemption provision and the statement-of-purpose section of the Act, the court found
that the scheme created is not 'so pervasive' nor the federal interest 'so dominant' to eradicate all [common law] claims." Id. (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181,
186 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1978)).
, See supra note 7 (Act's preemption provision).
26 See supra note 7 (emphasis added).
'7 See supra note 10 (comparing Cipollone and Dewey).)
28 See supra note 8 (cases finding health and safety concerns traditionally within state
police power).
'9 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
manifest purpose of Congress."). See also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (when Congress seeks to preempt part of commerce it must be
"unmistakably . . .ordained"); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902) (same).
30 See Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
715 (1985) (presumption exists that state and local regulation of health and safety matters
can coexist with federal regulation); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) ("basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law").
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may conclude that the presumption has not been overcome.3 1
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has suggested
that Congress may be willing to tolerate the incidental regulatory
pressure caused by state tort law."2 However, as a practical matter,
whenever state courts determine that the federally mandated label
is inadequate and impose penalties pursuant thereto, there is a
conflict, neither "hypothetical" nor "potential. "3 3
Common law standards developed through the case law of the
various states would result in multifarious labeling requirements
which manufacturers would be compelled to follow in order to
avoid liability in the future.' That is, if state common law actions
were permitted, manufacturers would be forced to amend their
warning labels to comply with state common law standards, or pay
damages each time a plaintiff brings a state action for inadequate
warning." Such indirect regulation, through damage awards, can
be as effective as direct statutory regulation. 6
31 See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 85-86, 577 A.2d 1239, 1247
(1990) (holding "State law" includes only statutory law).
. See English v. General Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990) (incidental regulatory pressure of state damage actions acceptable); Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174
(1988) (incidental regulatory pressure of state workmen's compensation law in federal areas
acceptable); Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (same).
33 Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1981) ("actual conflict" cannot be
"hypothetical" or "potential").
See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 627 (1st Cir. 1987) (when damages
awarded and verdict rendered against manufacturers, it compels manufacturer to conform
to requirement promulgated by jury); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187
(3d Cir. 1986) ("duties imposed through state common law damage actions have the effect
of requirements that are capable of creating an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1978).
Cf. Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 952 (3d Cir. 1980) (common law liability in
automobile manufacturing results in imposition of varying requirements from state to
state), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
Congress intended to avoid multifarious labeling requirements so as to minimize confusion in the industry. See HR. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1965 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2350, 2352 (labeling requirements should be uniform, "otherwise, a multiplicity of State and local regulations pertaining to labeling of cigarette packages could create chaotic marketing conditions and consumer confusion"); Comment, supra
note 3, at 578 (state law damage actions "would conflict with Congress' intent to have
uniform warnings").
" See supra note 34 (common law actions result in imposition of requirements).
'6 See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 121 N.J. 69, 88, 577 A.2d 1239, 1248 (1990)
(state law damages actions have regulatory effect); Comment, supra note 3, at 578 (same).
Cf San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) ("regulation can
be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventive
relief"); Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall 453 U.S. 571, 584 (1981) (following Garmon).
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Additionally, had Congress intended to preserve common law
tort actions it could have expressly done so in the statute. For
example, the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 198611 also requires manufacuturers of smokeless tobacco to place warning labels on their products. 9 In that Act,
Congress made a deliberate distinction between statutory and
common law, preempting only statutory law.4 0 Further, the Act
provided that "[n]othing in this chapter shall relieve any person
from liability at common-law or under State statutory law to any
other person.""1 It is submitted that Congress' failure to expressly
preserve common law tort actions in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act evinces an intent to preempt both statutory and common law.
While Congress was focusing on developing a uniform national
warning label requirement, it also had to consider the most effective means of informing the public of the health consequences related to cigarette smoking.' 2 It has been argued that Congress
achieved a "carefully wrought balance" of purposes by mandating
the inclusion of warning labels on cigarette packages, providing
the precise wording to be used and expressly preempting any additional state requirements or prohibitions.43 Therefore, "State
' See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 4406(c) (1988) (Act specifically states "[n]othing in this chapter
shall relieve any person from liability at common law or under State statutory law to any
other person."); 17 U.S.C. § 301(b) (1988) (Act specifically states, "[n]othing in this title...
limits any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State .... "); 33
U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1988) (Act states "[n]othing under this section shall restrict any right ...
under any statute or common law .... ").
- 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1988). This Act is particularly relevant because it is a superimposition of the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act upon the subject of smokeless
tobacco. Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408 (1988) with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1988).
", See 15 U.S.C, § 4402(a)(1) (1988).
40 See 15 US.C. § 4406(b) (1988). Instead of using the general term "State law" in the
preemption provision, Congress chose the words "State or local statute or regulation." Id.
41 15 U.S.C. § 4406(c) (1988).
42 See supra note 6 (stating Act's purpose and policy).

" See Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 421 (5th Cir. 1989) ("The Labeling
Act reflects a delicate political balance between two important goals: warning the public of
the hazards of cigarette smoking and protecting the national economy"); Roysdon v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234-35 (6th Cir. 1988) (Labeling Act represents
balancing of goals); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986)
(Act represents balance of purposes by Congress), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987); Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Minn. 1989) ("This policy represents a balance ....
); Crist & Majoras, supra note 1, at 561 (same).
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law" must include both statutory and common law, 44 as either
type of regulation would offset the balance of interests Congress
5
sought to protect.4
This balancing theory can be challenged however, on the
ground that the statute also provides that the national economy is
to be protected only to an extent "consistent with" the policy of
warning the public of potential health hazards." Rather than an
equilibrium between the two stated purposes, the implication is
that the Act's primary objective is public health.'7
C.

Legislative History

As previously stated, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act was adopted after substantial research uncovered the
many health hazards associated with cigarette smoking." The
House Report accompanying the bill reveals that the principal
purpose of the Act is to provide consumers with knowledge regarding these hazards so that they may make an informed
choice." In addition, witnesses who appeared before the Surgeon
General's Advisory Committee recognized the need for uniform
, See 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988). Although there is no "State law" definition provided in
the Act, Congress has supplied such a definition on prior occassions. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(c) (1988) ("The term 'State law' includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations or
other State action having the effect of law .... ); 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988) (persons no
longer entitled to rights under common law or statutory law of any state). See also Palmer
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 627 (1st Cir. 1987) ("the Act expressly prohibits
'state law,' not merely 'statutory law' "); Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69,
104 n.2, 577 A.2d 1239, 1257 n.2 (1990) ( Antell, P.J.A.D., dissenting) ("[The Act] did not
limit itself to statutory law and is plainly intended to encompass judicial determinations.").
4 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (regulation through
damage awards can
be as effective as regulation by state statutory law).
" See Dewey, 121 N.J. at 87, 577 A.2d at 1248. "It is significant that the second goal ....
must be achieved 'consistent with' and not 'to the detriment of' the first and principal goal
....Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE &
CONG. ADMIN. NEws 2350).
" See supra note 46 and accompanying text (Act's principal purpose is public health). In
addition, as to the design defect claim, the court, in response to defendants' insistance
upon congressionally struck balance, stated: "we find no legislative or judicial support for
the proposition that Congress engaged in its own risk-utility analysis .... Dewey, 121 N.J.
at 93, 577 A.2d at 1251.
48 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (discussing history of Act).
" See H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2350, 2352. The committee believed that an individual has the "right to
choose to smoke or not to smoke,"as well as the "right to know that smoking may be
hazardous to his health." Id.
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labeling requirements." ° Multifarious labeling requirements for
consumer products sold in interstate commerce would result in
substantial economic pressures5 affecting cigarette production,
manufacturing and distribution, related employment, and generation of tax revenues.5 2 The focus on conflicting concerns within
the legislative history supports the conclusion that with the adoption of the Act, Congress achieved a "carefully wrought balance"
of the competing goals, not to be "superseded by the views of a
single state." 5
Furthermore, as to the proper interpretation of "State law," in
1970, an amendment which would have expressly excluded state
common law from the Act's preemptive scope was rejected by
Congress.54 Thus, it is suggested that Congress retained the term
"State law" in order to include common law and statutory law
within the purview of the Act's preemption provision. In 1984,
this same amendment was rejected a second time. 55
II.

CASE LAW

A. The Prevailing Interpretation Inc.

Cipollone v. Liggett Group,

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,56 was the first to rule on the preemptive scope of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act. 7 In Cipollone, the court held that state tort claims challenging the adequacy of warnings appearing on cigarette packages and
60See id. at 2352. "There was general agreement among the witnesses appearing before
the committee. . . .that if the committee took any action . . .such a requirement as to
labeling should be uniform; ...... Id. (emphasis added).
&ISee id. "The problem had broad implications . . . and involves far-reaching consequences for a number of sectors of our economy." Id.
8 See id. at 2354.
" Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626 (1st Cir. 1987). See also supra note
43 (referring to cases finding Congress intended to balance Act's goals).
" See Crist & Majoras, supra note 1, at 563-64 (citing, Public Health Cigarette Labeling
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 5(a), 84 Stat. 87, 88 (1970)).
55 See Crist & Majoras, supra note 1, at 563-64 (citing, H.R. REP. No. 805, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984)).
:6 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
" See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 216 N.J. Super. 347, 351, 523 A.2d 712,
714 (1986) ("first federal appellate court to determine whether the act preempts state common law damage claims").
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in advertisements are preempted by the Act.6 8
Initially, the Cipollone court examined the purposes of the Act
as set forth in section 1331.5 9 The court concluded that the
mandatory warning label was the means by which Congress struck
a balance between the need to inform the public of the hazards of
cigarette smoking and the need to protect commerce and the national economy.6" Accordingly, it held "that the Act preempts
those state law damage actions relating to smoking and health that
challenge either the adequacy of the warning on cigarette packages or the propriety of a party's actions with respect to the advertising and promotion of cigarettes."" Such claims would upset the
congressionally set balance of purposes, and therefore, actually
62
conflict with the Act.
Other federal courts of appeal faced with this issue have
adopted the decision and reasoning of Cipollone."3 They agree that
a claim based on failure to provide adequate warning is preempted by the Act.64 They also agree that cigarette manufacturers are not completely immune from tort liability." For example,
a strict liability claim was not preempted in a later proceeding in
Cipollone, since a risk-utility analysis does not deal directly with the
08

See Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.

59 See supra note 6 (congressional declaration of policy and purpose of Act).
So See Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
1 Id.
02 See id. The court refers to several opinions where the Supreme Court recognizes "the
regulatory effect of state law damage claims and their potential for frustrating congressional objectives." Id. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
247 (1959) ("The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent
method of governing conduct and controlling policy."). "Applying this principle, [the
court concluded] that claims relating to smoking and health that result in liability for noncompliance with warning, advertisement, and promotion obligations other than those prescribed in the Act have the effect of tipping the Act's balance of purposes and therefore
actually conflict with the Act." Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
"5See Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 1989) ("We join our
sister circuits in holding that this claim [failure to provide adequate warning] is preempted."); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234 (6th Cir. 1988) ("We
agree with the Third Circuit ....
); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 625 (1st
Cir. 1987) (same); Stephen v. American Brands, Inc. 825 F.2d 312, 313 (lth Cir. 1987)
(same).
64 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (cases holding failure to warn claim
preempted).
'a See Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 186 (Act does not eradicate all plaintiffs claims). The court
preempted only those claims in "actual conflict" with the Act. Id. at 187.
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advertising of cigarettes.6 6 Further, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits
held that strict liability claims, applying the unreasonably dangerous standard, were not preempted by the Act.6" The First and
Eleventh Circuit holdings were limited to failure to warn claims,
since those courts did not address other theories of tort liability. 68
Similarly, at the state level, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in
Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.," agreed with the above-mentioned circuits, that failure to warn claims directly conflict with
the Act's purpose of "avoiding diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations. '""0 However,
the Forster court did recognize that the cigarette manufacturer's
advertising practices should not be immune from prosecution,
stating that the Act does not provide a "license to lie." 17 1 Thus, a
misrepresentation claim, for example, is not preempted because
the challenge is not to the adequacy of the federal warning, but to
7
the veracity of the manufacturer's promotional statements. 1
6 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 582 n.52 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991). The court found that a risk-utility claim is not preempted
since such a claim "involves the basic decision to market the product," rather than cigarette advertising and promotional activity. Id.
6 See Pennington, 876 F.2d at 424; Roysdon, 849 F.2d at 236. In Pennington, the court
found that the Act preempted state tort claims relating to cigarette labeling and promotional activities. Pennington, 876 F.2d at 423. However, the Act was not so pervasive as to
eliminate plaintiffs claim that cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous per se. Id. Nevertheless, the court granted defendant summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff failed to
create a substantial issue of fact as to an essential element of her cause of action; namely
that decedent's cancer was caused by a defect in defendant company's cigarettes. See id. at
427.
Similarly, in Roysdon, plaintiff's claim that defendant's cigarettes were defective and unreasonably dangerous never got to the jury. See Roysdon, 849 F.2d at 236. The court found
that the health risks associated with smoking could be considered part of common knowledge and therefore, there was no issue of fact for the jury to decide. See id.
" See Palmer, 825 F.2d at 629 ("state-based claim of inadequate warning preempted ...
by Act"); Stephen, 825 F.2d at 313 (adopted Cipollone decision but remanded case for discussion of plaintiff's various claims).
:9 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989).
0'Id. at 660.
11 Id. at 662. The court found that plaintiffs cause of action for intentional misrepresentation was not preempted since such a claim is based on "affirmative statements made
which are allegedly untrue." Id. This is different, the court notes, from "fraudulent concealment of information which would really be a variation of the duty to warn and hence
preempted." Id.
,' See supra note 71 (explaining difference between misrepresentation and fraudulent
concealment).
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B. A Divergent Interpretation Co.

Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco

Recently, in Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,1 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that the Act does not preempt state
common law tort actions for failure to warn, fraud, misrepresentation or design defect.7 4 While the court acknowledged that the
Act expressly prohibited any further state legislation concerning
warning labels, 75 it found that Congress neither expressly nor impliedly intended to preempt state common law tort actions.7 6
In Dewey, plaintiff sued several tobacco companies alleging that
her husband developed and later died from lung cancer, as a result of smoking defendants' cigarettes.7 The trial court upheld
plaintiff's design defect claim, 8 but dismissed the claims for fail121 N.J. 69, 577 A.2d 1239 (1990).
See id. at 94, 577 A.2d at 1251.
The Dewey court pointed out that preemption of traditional state matters is not acceptable " 'unless it was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' " Id. at 85, 577 A.2d at
1247 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963)).
The court found no such intent by Congress. See id. at 94, 577 A.2d at 1251.
'5 See id. at 82-90, 577 A.2d at 1245-49. Although the court does not directly state that
the Act explicitly prohibits additional state-imposed warnings, it can be inferred thoughout
the opinion. See id. First, the court examined the Cipollone decision which explained that
the Act's "preemption provision explicitly prohibits states . . . from requiring any additional warning ....
Id. at 82, 577 A.2d at 1245. The Dewey court implicitly agreed with
this statement. See id. at 85-88, 577 A.2d at 1247-48. The difference between the two
opinions was rooted in whether or not common law tort actions were in actual conflict with
the Act and thereby preempted. See id. at 86, 577 A.2d at 1247. Moreover, the Dewey court
implicitly recognized that regulation, in the form of injunctive or declaratory relief, was
prohibited by the Act. See id. at 90, 577 A.2d at 1249.
" See id. at 86, 577 A.2d at 1247. See Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 41821 (5th Cir. 1989) (no express or implied preemption in Act); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230, 234 (6th Cir. 1988) (same); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
789 F.2d 181, 185-87 (3d Cir. 1986) (same), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987). See generally
supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text (discussing law of preemption).
7 See Dewey, at 73, 577 A.2d at 1241. Claire Dewey filed suit, individually and as executrix of her husband's estate, against defendants R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., R.J. Reynolds
Industries Inc., American Brands, Inc., and Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. See id. at 73,
577 A.2d at 1240-41. Brown & Williamson moved for summary judgment claiming that
plaintiff's claims were preempted by the Act and that the complaint failed to state a cause
of action under New Jersey substantive law. See id.
78 See id. at 356, 523 A.2d at 717. Plaintiff's design defect claim was not preempted, as it
does not necessarily assert that the cigarette manufacturer "bears any duty to warn." Id.
When a risk-utility analysis reveals that a product is unavoidably unsafe, "manufacturers
cannot insulate themselves from liability merely by placing warnings on their products." Id.
at 357, 523 A.2d at 717 (citing O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 183, 463 A.2d 298,
307 (1983)). As such, the court believed that plaintiff should be given the opportunity to
prove the risks posed by cigarette use outweigh their usefulness. See id. at 357-58, 523 A.2d
73
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ure to warn, fraud and misrepresentation in advertising based on
the ground that they were preempted by the Act.7 9 The dismissal
of the claims was predicated upon the belief that the court was
bound by the Cipollone decision. 0 In allowing the claim for design
defect, the court asserted that "Cipollone made clear that the regulatory scheme of the [cigarette] act and the federal interest involved was not so pervasive as to preclude all tort remedies which
a plaintiff in smoking and health-related litigation may have under
state law."" 1 The case was affirmed on appeal," but subsequently
reversed by New Jersey's highest court.8 3
The New Jersey Supreme Court found that although the Third
Circuit's decision was to be accorded due respect, 4 it reasoned
at 717. Additionally, plaintiff did not have to prove the existence of a safer alternative,
since a jury may conclude that the risks outweigh their utility. See id.
On appeal, the appellate division affirmed the trial court's findings, subject to modifications made necessary by intervening law. See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J.
69, 74, 577 A.2d 1239, 1241 (1990). The appellate division concluded, pursuant to comment i of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 402A, that the jury should not weigh the risks and
utility inherent in cigarette smoking, since the dangers were within the contemplation of
decedent as an ordinary consumer. See id. at 74-75, 577 A.2d at 1241-42. However, plaintiff was entitled to present evidence regarding alternative design pertaining to defendant's
cigarettes. See id. at 75, 577 A.2d at 1242.
" See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 216 N.J. Super. 347, 353, 523 A.2d 712,
716 (1986).
80 See Dewey, 216 N.J. Super. at 353-54, 523 A.2d at 715. The trial court determined
that it was bound by the Third Circuit's decision in Cipollone, since "New Jersey courts
have long adhered to the principle that when confronted with the interpretation and application of a federal statute, federal decisional law is binding upon the state court." Id. at
353, 523 A.2d at 712 (citing Southern Pac. Co. v. Wheaton Brass Works, 5 N.J. 594, 76
A.2d 890 (1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951)). Additionally, while there was dispute
among federal district courts as to the preemptive effect of the Act on state common law
tort actions, there was no such conflict among the federal circuit courts, as the Third Circuit's decision was the sole determination on this level. Id. at 353-54, 523 A.2d at 712.
Since this decision was the highest judicial authority at that time, the trial court found
themselves bound by the Third Circuit's construction of the Act. Id. at 354, 523 A.2d at
712.
" Dewey, 121 N.J. at 74, 577 A.2d at 1241 (1990). The trial court further noted that a
plaintiff could pursue a design-defect claim by showing, under the "risk-utility" test, that
the risks posed by cigarettes outweigh their utility. See id. See supra notes 79-80 (discussing
trial court's rationale).
s See Dewey, 121 N.J. at 74, 577 A.2d at 1241. See supra note 79 (discussing appellate
division modifications of trial court holding).
s3 See Dewey, 121 N.J. at 100, 577 A.2d at 1255.
" See Id., 121 N.J. at 80, 577 A.2d at 1244. The Dewey court found that the principle of
"judicial comity" applied. See id. "In general, principle of 'comity' is that courts of one
state or jurisdiction will give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but out of deference and mutual respect." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 242 (5th ed. 1979). The court pointed out that judicial comity discourages
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that it was not bound by the decision because a lower federal
court and a state court occupy coordinate positions in the judicial
hierarchy when determining federal questions. "5 Thus, the New
Jersey Supreme Court undertook an independent analysis,8 6 examining the Act and the power of Congress, pursuant to the
supremacy clause, to enact federal legislation which preempts
state common and statutory law.8 7
The court found no express congressional intent to preempt
state common law tort actions, nor would it infer such intent in
the absence of an unambiguous mandate, since this is an area traditionally defined by state law." Additionally, it found no indication that compliance with both the federal and state law was impossible. 9 The court then examined whether the state law created
an obstacle, thereby causing an actual conflict and frustrating the
purpose of the Act.9 0 Essential to the court's holding was its findforum shopping. Dewey, 121 N.J. at 80, 577 A.2d at 1244. However, the court went on to
reject the Third Circuit's holding. See id. at 86, 577 A.2d at 1247.
85 See id. at 79, 577 A.2d at 1243-44. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Dewey, found
that the trial court misconstrued the holding in Southern Pac. Co. v. Wheaton Brass
Works, 5 N.J. 594, 76 A.2d 890, cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951), and therefore incorrectly concluded that the Third Circuit decision in Cipollone was binding on the New Jersey
courts. Dewey, 121 N.J. at 79, 577 A.2d at 1243. Wheaton Brass Works required "consideration of the applicable provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act as construed by the federal courts whose decisions on federal problems are controlling." Id. (quoting Wheaton
Brass Works, 5 N.J. at 598, 76 A.2d at 890). The New Jersey Supreme Court was referring
to the binding nature of United States Supreme Court decisions and not lower federal
court cases. See id. See generally Note, Authority in State Courts of Lower FederalCourt Decisions
on National Law, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1948) (state courts should not consider themselves
bound by lower federal court decisions).
86 See Dewey, 121 N.J. at 79-80, 577 A.2d at 1244.
See id. at 80-94, 577 A.2d at 1244-51 (New Jersey Supreme Court's analysis).
See id. at 86, 577 A.2d at 1247 (1990). See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text
(discussing preemption doctrine).
The Dewey court cited several opinions to support its conclusion that the Act neither
expressly nor impliedly preempts state common law tort actions. See Dewey, 121 N.J. at 86,
577 A.2d at 1247. However, several of those courts did find implied preemption because
they concluded that the actual conflict standard was a form of implied preemption, rather
than the separate standard of preemption analysis the Dewey court applied. See, e.g., Palmer
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 625-26 (1st Cir. 1987) (since only effect is important,
there is no need to label types of preemption); Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 789 F.2d
181, 186-87 (3d Cir. 1986) ("actual conflict" is form of implied preemption), cert denied,
479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
" See Dewey, 121 N.J. at 86, 577 A.2d at 1247.
90 See Id. at 87, 577 A.2d at 1248. The court noted that the " 'actual conflict' analysis is
,more an exercise of policy choices by a court than strict statutory construction.' " Id. at
86-87, 577 A.2d at 1247 (quoting Abbot by Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d
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ing that, based on the Act's plain meaning 91 and legislative history, the "principal purpose" was informing the public,92 while
protecting commerce and the national economy was of secondary
concern."' The court focused on the language of the Act which
provided that protection of commerce and the economy may be
achieved only when "consistent with" protecting public welfare.9 4
The court thereby rejected the court's argument in Cipollone that
the warning label, as mandated by the Act, represented a congressionally created balance between the Act's two purposes, which
state tort claims would upset. 5
Instead, the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that a state
common law tort action would further the primary goal of adequately informing the public,"' while any regulatory effect stemming from a damage claim would be merely incidental,"' and
1108 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988). A court must first consider the purposes
of the federal law in question and then assess the effect of state law on those purposes. See
id. at 87, 577 A.2d at 1247. The effect, or conflict, "must be more than 'hypothetical' or
'potential' ". Id. at 87, 577 A.2d at 1247-48 (citing Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S.
654, 659 (1982)).
91 See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). The Caminetti Court stated
that the meaning of a statute must first be sought in the language of the Act, "and if that is
plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the law-making body which
passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." Id.
92 See Dewey, 121 N.J. at 87, 577 A.2d at 1248. See also H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2350, 2350. The House
Report states that the "[pirincipal purpose of the bill is to provide adequate warning to the
public of the potential hazards of cigarette smoking by requiring" warning labels. Id. But
see U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2354. The description of the bill, includes as its
policy informing the public and protecting commerce and the national economy. See id.
The language of the Act also provides for this dual purpose, placing no particular emphasis
on either of the stated goals. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) (declaration of Act's policy and
purpose).
93 See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 87, 577 A.2d 1239, 1248
(1990) (second goal must be achieved in manner "consistent with" first and principal goal).
94 See id. See also supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text (Dewey favors public
awareness).
95 See supra note 92-93 and accompanying text (Act's principal purpose is public health;
no evidence of balancing). But see supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (discussing
Cipollone court's analysis).
See Dewey, 121 N.J. at 87-88, 577 A.2d at 1248 (common law tort remedies will result
in further information to public).
97 See id. at 90, 577 A.2d at 1249 ("Defendants overstate the regulatory pressure that
state-law damage claims would generate"); infra note 100 (how manufacturers may alter
conduct in response to judgment of liability).
The court also points out that state tort claims "advance a substantial goal apart from
regulating behavior: to provide compensation to those injured by deleterious products
when that result is consistent with public policy." Dewey, 69 N.J. at 90, 577 A.2d at 1249.

250

Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
therefore, not impair the goal of uniformity necessary for the protection of commercial and economic welfare. 98 The court emphasized that exposure to liability, not in the form of injunctive or
declaratory relief, does not dictate additional labeling requirements, and therefore, the Act's prohibition against further regulation is not breached.99 For example, a tobacco company may respond to state-imposed obligations by modifying its warning label,
but it is not compelled to do so. °0 Furthermore, the court noted
that the Supreme Court of the United States had "suggest[ed]
that Congress may be willing to tolerate the regulatory consequences of the application of state tort law even where direct state
regulation is preempted."1 °1
Finally, the court was "convinced that had Congress intended to
immunize cigarette manufacturers from [liability], it knew how to
As such, "a New Jersey jury could decide that a cigarette manufacturer ... ought to bear
the costs of [plaintiffs] injuries that could have been prevented with a more detailed warning ... ." Id. at 92, 577 A.2d at 1250.
0 See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 87-94, 577 A.2d 1239, 1248-51
(1990) (regulatory effect indirect and should be tolerated).
'9 See id. at 90, 577 A.2d at 1249 (citing Garner, Cigarette Dependancy and Civil Liability:
A Modest Proposal,53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1454 (1980) ("a damage award ... requires only
payment - it is not an injunction requiring the defendant to incorporate into its advertising a fixed legend different from the federally required label")).
0 See id. The Dewey court described several ways a manufacturer may choose to respond
to a judgment of liability:
(1) [by] adding an additional warning (which would not be barred under the Cigarette Act because the preemption provision section provides that no statement shall
be "required," hence, there is no prohibition against a manufacturer "voluntarily"
saying more); or (2) [by] placing a package insert in the product, as has been done
with a multitude of pruducts; or (3) [by] simply choosing to do nothing and risking
exposure to liability.
Id. But see Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 627 (1st Cir. 1987) ("This 'choice
of reaction' seems akin to the free choice of coming up for air after being underwater.").
101 Dewey, 121 N.J. at 89, 577 A.2d at 1249. The court commented on several cases
where the regulatory effect of state damage actions was permitted. For example, in
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984), the Court held that although the
Atomic Energy Act preempts state regulation of the safety aspects of nuclear power, an
award of punitive damages for conduct related to radiation hazards was not preempted. Id.
at 249-56. Note however, that in contrast to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, the Atomic Energy Act contained an amendment which was based on state law
remedies. See id. at 253-54.
In English v. General Electric Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990), the Court found plaintiff's state
law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress did "not lie within the preempted
field of nuclear safety" protected by the Energy Reorganization Act. Id. at 2278-79. Again,
as in Silkwood, the Court found congressional intent to preempt state law claims. See id.
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do so with unmistakable specificity.' 10 2 Therefore, plaintiff's
claims were not preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act.10 3
It is submitted that Cipolone and its progeny have taken a more
comprehengive approach, recognizing the entire scope of the Act,
while Dewey places primary emphasis on health and safety aspects
at the expense of commercial and economic concerns, thereby
missing the Act's full import.
III.

RAMIFICATIONS -

A

NEW YORK PERSPECTIVE

The Dewey decision marked a drastic departure from preexisting
case law concerning private tort actions based on the inadequacy
of cigarette warning labels.'0 4 It is submitted that this departure is
likely to produce a wave of litigation throughout the states which
have not yet considered the preemptive effect of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.' To date, the only state supreme courts that have ruled on this issue are those of Minnesota 0 6 and New Jersey. 10 7 The question facing plaintiffs' attorneys
around the country is whether the courts of the states in which
they practice will adopt the approach taken by the ambitious New
Jersey court,'08 or follow those jurisdictions which have concluded
that tort actions challenging the adequacy of cigarette warning la101

Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 94, 577 A.2d 1239, 1251 (1990).
See id.

'" Compare Dewey, 121 N.J. at 94, 577 A.2d at 1251 (1990) (holding actions based on
inadequacy of warning label not preempted) with Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893
F.2d 541, 582 (3d Cir. 1990) (Act preempts action challenging party's actions in advertising or promotion of cigarettes), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991) and supra notes 11
and 63 (decisions in agreement with Cipollone). See generally Marcotte, Cigarette Decision, 76
A.B.A. J. 34 (Nov. 1990) (Dewey decision differs from five U.S. Courts of Appeal and Minnesota Supreme Court dicisions).
10 See Note, The Effect of Cipollone: Has the Tobacco Industry Lost its Impenetrable Shield?,
23 GA. L. REV. 763, 771 (1989). "Strict liability emerged during the 1960's as the preferred
theory under which to challenge manufacturers for product defects." Id. One way to bring
such an action is by alleging that a defective warning label made the product dangerous.
See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 698-702 (5th ed. 1984). This
was the most appealing way for a smoker to bring a strict liability claim against a cigarette
manufacturer. See Note, supra at 771.
106 See Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.E.2d 655, 662 (Minn. 1989).
1 See Dewey, 121 N.J. at 94, 577 A.2d at 1251.
'" See id.
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bels are preempted by the Act. 109 To answer this question, it will
be necessary for attorneys to examine the preemptive effect of
other federal statutes upon tort law within their respective
states.'
New York has been chosen as a test state because of its
traditional role as a leader in tort law, particularly in the area of
products liability."' Based upon this examination, it is submitted
that plaintiffs in New York will ultimately be left without a remedy, based on a failure to warn claim, and that this result may
have a chilling effect on similar claims brought in other states.
Focusing initially on the trial court level, it appears that a plaintiff would be able to maintain such an action in at least one county
of New York.1 2 Garcia v. Rivera, " a case in the Supreme Court
of Bronx County, involving provisions of the Federal Motor Carriers Safety Regulations,"' addressed the distinction between state
statutory regulation and regulation by state common law."' As in
109 See supra note
11 (citing cases which found claims based on failure to warn preempted by Act).
'10 See, e.g., infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text (examining areas of tort law in
New York).
"1 Cf Green, Fifty Years of Tort Law Teaching, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 499, 500 (1966) (Judge
Cardozo in McPherson v. Buick Motor Co. broke "all the barriers of 19th century tort law
....
The horizons of tort litigation in [products liability] are no longer discernable.").
112 See, e.g, infra notes 117-21 (discussing view of Supreme Court of Bronx County).
143 Misc. 2d 788, 541 N.Y.S.2d 880 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 160 A.D.2d 274, 553 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1st Dep't 1990).
" 49 C.F.R § 390-397 (1989). Under the Federal Motor Carriers Safety Regulations
(FMCSR), state legislative regulations, if consistent with federal regulation, are not preempted. Garcia, 143 Misc. 2d at 795, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 886 (citing Specialized Carriers &
Rigging Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 795 F.2d 1152, 1156 (4th Cir. 1986)). The
federal regulation states that parts 390-397 "are not intended to preclude States or subdivisions thereof from establishing or enforcing State or local laws relating to safety,... which
would not prevent full compliance with these regulations .... " 49 CF.R § 390.9 (1989).
11
See Garcia, 143 Misc. 2d at 793-96, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 885-86. Defendant Freuhauf
asserted that there was "a distinction between state legislative regulation, which if not inconsistent [with the Act], is clearly not preempted, and common law tort claims." Id. at
796, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 886. Thedistinction is that state tort liability would undermine the
purposes of the Act. Id. It is interesting that the defendant was seeking to distinguish state
tort regulation in order to escape liability, while in Dewey, the court asserted the same distinction in order to impose liability. See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69,
86, 577 A.2d 1239, 1247 (1990) (no indication that compliance with both state and federal
law impossible).
It is submitted that there is an important difference between saying that a common law
tort action is not preempted because this type of regulation is too incidental to cause a
conflict, and saying that such a claim is not preempted because the nature of the specific
claim is unrelated to the subject matter of the federal law. In the first instance, it is suggested that implied preemption can never occur no matter how directly related the tort is
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Dewey, the Garcia court relied on the Supreme Court's analysis in
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,"'6 which suggested that Congress was
willing to tolerate the incidental regulatory effects of common law
recovery in circumstances where direct regulation had been expressly preempted. 1" The Garcia court concluded that the state
tort liability did not, "jeopardize the effectiveness of the Federal
regulation,"' 1 8 nor was it impossible to comply with both the "federal regulation and State common-law standards of care."" 9 The
court reached this conclusion notwithstanding defendant's argument that a standard of care established by state common law
would disrupt Congress' efforts to establish a uniform safety design. 20 As in Dewey, this court's concern for public safety and
to the subject matter of the federal law. In the second instance, preemption depends on a
comparison of the objectives between the competing law. The Third Circuit, in Cipollone,
stated that "the test enunciated by this court for addressing a potential conflict between
state and federal law requires us 'to examine first the purposes of the federal law and
second the effect of operation of the state law on these purposes.' " Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50,
63 (3rd Cir. 1980) (en banc) (citing Perez v. Campell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971))), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1043 (1987). It is submitted that regarding the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, it is unlikely that courts taking the latter approach will reach the same conclusion
reached in Dewey.
'6
464 U.S. 238 (1984).
17 See id. at 256. Although there is a tension between making safety regulation the exclusive concern of the federal law, and awarding damages for personal injury based on
state law, it appears Congress was willing to tolerate this tension. See id. See also Garcia, 143
Misc. 2d at 796, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 886. The court stated that in Silkwood, although state
regulations were preempted, "the Supreme Court let [an] award of punitive damages stand
in spite of the fact that one of the purposes of punitive damages is to regulate standards of
conduct." Id. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256. See also English v. General Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct.
2270, 2277 (1990) (employees state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
allowed although it bore some relation to Energy Reorganization Act.); Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (punitive
damages allowed to stand despite tension between compliance with federal regulations). But
see San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246-47 (1959) ("The obligation to pay compensation can be .... a potent method of governing conduct .... [The]
State's salutory effort to redress private wrongs ... cannot be exerted to regulate activities
...subject to the .. .federal regulatory scheme.").
'" Garcia v. Rivera, 143 Misc. 2d 788, 796, 541 N.Y.S.2d 880, 886 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 160 A.D.2d 274, 553 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1st Dep't 1990).
119

Id.

Id. at 794-96 (emphasis added). It appears that the defendant was seeking the type 6f
policy balancing rejected by the Dewey court. Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121
N.J. 69, 93, 577 A.2d 1239, 1251 (1990).'Cf Comment, Common Law Claims Challenging the
Adequacy of Cigarette Warnings Preempted Under the FederalCigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act of 1965: Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 60 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 754, 768 n.57 (1986)
(every piece of legislation can be considered a "careful balance," therefore, such a balance
is meaningless). Contra Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187 ("Congress has provided us with an ex0
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health superseded its concern for uniformity and commerce.12 1
More recently, in Little v. Dow Chemical Co.,122 the Supreme
Court for the County of Erie considered the viability of state common law actions where direct state regulation had been expressly
preempted by an act of Congress.123 In Dow Chemical, a case involving the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA"),' 2 4 plaintiff's tort actions based on claims of improper
labeling and failure to warn were held to be preempted,' 25 even
26
though no mention was made in FIFRA of common law actions.
-plicit statement of the Act's purpose . . . [which] reveals

. . .

a carefully drawn balance

Cf Garcia, 143 Misc. 2d at 796, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 886. The court declared that, "[i]n
the area of health and safety regulations, [there] is ...a presumption against preemption."
Id. It should be noted however, that under FMCSR, the federal agency intended to supply
only the minimum standards. Id. at 797, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
Similar emphasis on public health can be found in Tigue v. E.R. Squibb & Sons Inc., 136
Misc. 2d 467, 518 N.Y.S.2d 891 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1987) (case involving marketing
prescription drugs), af'd, 139 A.D. 2d 431, 526 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1st Dep't 1988). Here, the
need for product safety and efficacy was balanced against the possible burden on interstate
commerce. Tigue, 136 Misc. 2d at 474, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 896-97. Where product safety is
promoted through compensation to victims of wrongdoers and the burden on interstate
commerce is the cost of the liability, ultimately passed on to consumers, the burden on
commerce must give way. Id. at 475, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 897. Cf. Berardi v. Getty Ref. &
Mktg. Co., 107 Misc. 2d 451, 455-56, 435 N.Y.S.2d 212, 216 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County
1980) ("state's interest in fashioning rules of tort is paramount to any discernable federal
interest except where the state acts arbitrarily.") (citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
277 (1980)).
122 148 Misc. 2d 11, 559 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1990).
12 See id. at 13, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 790 ("State regulation of pesticide labelling is expressly
preempted. No mention is made, however, of state common law negligence actions.").
7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988).
121 See Dow Chemical, 148 Misc. 2d at 13-14, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 790-91. FIFRA provides,
"[a] state shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling .. .in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter." 7 U.S.C. § 136-v(b) (1988).
"26See Dow Chemical, 148 Misc. 2d at 13, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 790. The Dow Chemical court
began its preemption analysis by reviewing the legislative history of FIFRA. Id. at 13, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 790-91. The court noted that there was no express preemption, given the
language of the Act, nor was there implied preemption, given FIFRA's regulatory scheme
which provided that "the intent of this provision is to leave to the States the authority to
impose stricter regulation on pesticides' use than that required under the Act." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 838, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in 1972 U.S CODE, CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 3993, 4021).
Secondly, the court reviewed prior case law which held that failure to warn claims were
not preempted under FIFRA. Id. at 13-14, 559 N.Y.2d at 790-91. See, e.g., Ferebee v.
Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542-43 (D.C. Cir.) (there is no preemption given
that FIFRA is regulatory statute and no affirmative requirement on states to accept use of
EPA pesticides, and that there is savings clause), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
Notwithstanding the legislative history, the existence of a savings clause, and a previous
case to the contrary, the court found that preemption existed because such state tort claims
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The court found that the impact of state common law recovery, in
terms of regulatory pressure, would conflict with the aims of
FIFRA, thereby triggering preemption of the claims.12 7 As in Cipollone, the court found neither express nor implied preemption
of the common law actions, 128 but maintained its decision to dis1 29
miss under the "actual conflict" standard.
The Dow Chemical case is notable, as it is the only case in New
York which refers to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. 0 In Dow Chemical, defendant relied on the First Circuit's
decision in Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., ' in asserting that the
common law was preempted under FIFRA. " ' The Dow court,
however, rejected defendant's contention that Palmer was controlling by distinguishing it on the ground that the Cigarette Labeling
Act mandated the precise wording of the label, while under
FIFRA, Congress required only minimum standards. 3
At the appellate level, the courts have not considered the preemption issue in terms of a statutory-common law dichotomy, 3
would violate the purposes of FIFRA. See Dow Chemical, 148 Misc. 2d at 14, 559 N.Y.S.2d
at 791.
1'7 Dow Chemical, 148 Misc. 2d at 13-14, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 790-91. The court was ultimately persuaded by the United States Supreme Court's decision in International Paper
Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), which undermined the precedential value of Ferebee,
because the impact of the state common law tort action in Ouellette was "too analogous to
ignore." See Dow Chemical, 148 Misc. 2d at 14, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 791. The Dow Chemical
court noted InternationalPaper's argument that a state should not be allowed to do indirectly what it could not do directly. Id. It appears that in accepting this argument, the Dow
Chemical court acknowledged that the statutory/common law dichotomy, as applied to preemption, is a distinction without meaning. See id. See also supra note 10 and accompanying
text (discussing International Paper).
128 See Dow Chemical, 148 Misc. 2d at 14, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
129 See id. at 13, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
180 See id. at 14, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
'1
825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
:3, See Dow Chemical, 148 Misc. 2d at 14, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 791.

181 Id.
134 See,

e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Carlson, 158 A.D.2d 206, 219, 558 N.Y.S.2d 754, 762 (4th
Dep't 1990) (Petroleum Products Distribution Agreement examined side by side with New
York's General Business Law to determine preemptive effect of federal law on state statutory claim); Stuto v. Coastal Dry Dock and Repair Corp., 153 A.D.2d 937, 940, 545
N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (2d Dep't 1989) ("Congress did not 'intend that the negligence remedy
authorized in the bill shall be applied differently in different parts depending on the law of
the State in which the port may be located' "); Wolf St. Supermarkets, Inc. v. McPartland,
108 A. D.2d 25, 31, 487 N.Y.S.2d 442, 447 (4th Dep't 1985) (use of abusive language
during picketing protected from defamation action only to degree there is not actual malice, so preemption is only partial); Editorial Photocolor Archives, Inc. v. Granger Collec-
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but instead, have focused on the tangential nature of the tort action at issue in relation to the area of law actually preempted. 135 If
the tort action is too closely related to the subject matter actually
preempted, the state action "must yield.""" This type of analysis
the reasoning in Cipollone than with
seems more in accord with
1 37
that of the Dewey court.
The First Department, in Editorial Photocolor Archives, Inc. v.
Granger Collections, 38 noted that the Federal Copyright Act expressly provides that individuals are no longer entitled to any
rights under the copyright laws of any state,13 9 and that the purpose of preemption in the Act was to "bring some system of order
into the protection of copyright interest[s]. ' "'4 However, the
court held that plaintiffs claims did not involve a substantial copyright question. " " This enabled the state court to maintain jurisdiction over the claims. 4 2
tion, 94 A.D.2d 347, 350, 464 N.Y.S.2d 506, 508 (1st Dep't 1983) (involving copyright law
and fact that state court can have jurisdiction if disputable copyright question), rev'd, 61
N.Y.2d 517, 463 N.E.2d 365, 474 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1984). See generally supra note 115 (discussing common law in terms of preemption).
18 See infra notes 142, 144-47, 149 and 152 (cases focusing on tangential nature of tort
action to decide if preemption present).
18' See Wolf, 108 A.D.2d at 29, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 446 ("due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield") (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1984)).
187 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181,
188 (3d Cir. 1986) (majority
maintained that "a court should avoid a holding of preemption that is premised on a
merely potential conflict between state and federal law"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043
(1987). The Dewey court, on the other hand, speaks of the regulatory effect of state law
damage claims as overstated, and that there really is no regulatory effect short of injunctive
or declaratory relief. See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 90, 577 A.2d
1239, 1249 (1990).
1388 94 A.D.2d 347, 464 N.Y.S.2d 506 (ist Dep't 1983), rev'd, 61 N.Y.2d 517, 463
N.E.2d 365, 474 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1984).
189 See id. at 351, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 508. Section 301(a) of title 17 provides: "On and after
January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright . . . are governed exclusively by this title." 17
U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988).
140 Editorial Photocolor Archives, Inc. v. Granger Collection, 94 A.D.2d 347, 349, 464
N.Y.S.2d 506, 507 (Ist Dep't 1983).
141 See id. at 350, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 508. Plaintiffs claims included unfair competition,
misappropriation, piracy, and violation of a New York anti-dilution statute. Id. at 348, 464
N.Y.S.2d at 507.
148 See id. The court's reasoning illustrates the difference of approach between the trial
courts and appellate courts of New York. See id. at 350, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 508, Justice
Silverman, dissenting, also viewed the issue as it related to the Federal Act, but reached the
opposite conclusion. Id. at 354, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 510 (Silverman, J., dissenting). "[T]he
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The Fourth Department, in Wolf Street Supermarkets, Inc. v.
13 applied the
McPartland,"
same analysis in the area of labor rela4
tions law.
Although the Wolf court dismissed plaintiff's claims
for lack of proof, the court noted that "[s]tates are not required
to yield jurisdiction when the conduct touches concerns deeply
rooted in local feelings . . . or [if] State regulation . . . would im' 45
plicate . . . Federal labor laws only peripherally." "
New York's court of last resort has approached the preemption
problem in much the same way as the intermediary courts,"4 6 albeit with a seemingly greater willingness to preempt state court
claim of unfair competition must relate to rights 'that are not equivalent to any ...within
the general scope of the copyright.' " Id. at 353, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 510 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (quoting Copyright Act 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (1988)).
:43
108 A.D.2d 25, 487 N.Y.S.2d 442 (4th Dep't 1985).
44 See id. at 29-30, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 446-47. The court's analysis began with a statement
that although state tort law damages for recognitional picketing is mostly preempted by the
National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(7)(c), the United States Supreme Court, in San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), established that the presumption of
preemption may be overcome if the conduct is deeply rooted in state tradition or would
only indirectly affect the Federal Act. See Wolf, 108 A.D.2d at 29-30, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 44647. The Wolf court also referred to the New York district court case of Palm Beach Co. v.
Journeymen's and Production Allied Services of America and Canada International Union
Local 157, 519 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), which maintained that "[t]he task for the
Court is thus to weigh the state's interest in applying its law of tortious interference with
business relations against the federal interest in resisting application of that law, and to
make its preemption decision according to the outcome of that balancing process." Palm
Beach Co., 519 F. Supp. at 712-13. The court noted that a classic example of when preemption would not take place would be "a case wherein the challenged conduct touches concerns deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility." Wolf, 108 A.D.2d at 30, 487
N.Y.S.2d at 447 (quoting Palm Beach Co., 519 F. Supp. at 713.).
145 Wolf, 108 A.D.2d at 30, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 447. If plaintiff had successfully
made out a
case for defamation (a showing of malice and special damages), his cause of action would
not have been dismissed because defamation is only a "peripheral concern of the Federal
labor laws ......
Id. at 31, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
146 See generally Tap Elec. Contracting Servs. Inc. v. Hartnett, 76 N.Y.2d
164, 170, 556
N.E.2d 427, 429, 556 N.Y.S.2d 988, 990 (1990) (no preemption in area of labor law because state law requiring employees on state funded projects to be classified as apprentices
did not conflict with Davis-Bacon Act); Planned Consumer Mktg., Inc. v. Coats & Clark,
Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 442, 449-50, 522 N.E.2d 30, 35, 527 N.Y.S.2d 185, 190 (1988) (only state
laws that directly or indirectly regulate conditions of employee benefit plans preempted by
ERISA); Meyers v. Waverly Fabrics, Div. of F. Schumacher & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 75, 78, 479
N.E.2d 236, 237-38, 489 N.Y.S.2d 891, 893 (1985) (per curiam) (Copyright Act not intended to preempt cases involving such activities as false labeling and breach of contract
because they are not "within the general scope of copyright"); Editorial Photocolor
Archives, Inc. v. Granger Collection, 61 N.Y.2d 517, 521-23, 463 N.E.2d 365, 366-68, 474
N.Y.S.2d 964, 965-67 (1984) (claims dealing with unlawful reproduction and sale of film
transparencies are not common law claims for unfair competition but fall under Federal
copyright laws).
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actions. For example, the court of appeals reversed the lower
court's decision in Editorial Photocolor, finding the rights asserted
by plaintiffs to be the equivalent of property rights protected by
federal copyright laws. 4 Similarly, in Meyers v. Waverly Fabrics,
Division ofF. Schumacher & Co.,148 the court of appeals determined
that causes of action would be preempted
if they were the mere
1 49
infringements.
copyright
of
equivalents
In the field of employee benefits law, the court of appeals in
Planned Consumer Marketing, Inc. v. Coats and Clark, Inc.,' ° was
faced with determining the extent to which the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act.. ("ERISA") preempted state
law.' 5 2 ERISA contains a supersedure clause similar to the preemption clause found in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. 5 ' The supersedure clause provides that ERISA
"shall supersede any . . .State laws insofar as they . . .relate to
any employee benefit plan. 1' 54 However, unlike the preemption
clause in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,
there was no doubt that "State laws" included both statutory law
and common law, as ERISA specifically provided a definition of
147 EditorialPhotocolor, 61 N.Y.2d at 521-22, 463 N.E.2d at 367, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 966. In
a frank characterization of plaintiffs' claims the court stated, "Plaintiffs could not, by miscasting their causes of action, secure the equivalent of copyright protection under guise of
State law." Id. at 523, 463 N.E.2d at 368, 474 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
14865 N.Y.2d 75, 479 N.E.2d 236, 489 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1985) (per curiam).
140 See id. at 78, 479 N.E.2d at 237-38, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 893. Plaintiff's claims included:
breach of oral contract, misrepresentation through false labeling, unauthorized licensing,
damages to reputation through the inferior quality of the product licensed, and interference with contract relations. Id. at 77, 479 N.E.2d at 237, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 892. Of these
five causes of action, the latter three were preempted as "not different in kind from copyright infringement." Id. at 78, 479 N.E.2d at 238, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
150 71 N.Y.2d 442, 522 N.E.2d 30, 527 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1988).
161 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). As in the Cigarette Labeling Act, the purpose of ERISA was
to provide uniformity. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988). The court in Planned Consumer
Marketing, Inc., noted that ERISA is "a 'comprehensive and reticulated statute' . . .
adopted ... to ensure that 'if a worker has been promised a defined pension benefit upon
retirement - and if he has fulfilled whatever conditions are required to obtain a vested
benefit . . .he actually receives it.' " Planned Consumer Mktg., Inc. v. Coats And Clark,
Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 442, 448, 522 N.E.2d 30, 33, 527 N.Y.S.2d 185, 188 (1988) (quoting
Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361, 375 (1980)).
162 See Planned Consumer Mktg., 71 N.Y.2d at 448-49, 522 N.E.2d at 34, 527 N.Y.S.2d at
189-90 (despite ERISA's supersedure clause, "no court has held that ERISA precludes any
State court action even where an ERISA plan is only tangentially implicated").
"'6 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988) (Cigarette Labeling Act) with 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(1988) (ERISA). •
1 4 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).

259

journal of Legal Commentary

Vol. 6: 233, 1991

the term. 55 The court, therefore, included common law within
the meaning of state law.' 56 In determining whether the particular
claim before it was preempted, the court did not focus on the incidental regulatory effects of the common law, as Dewey had
done,"' but once again, focused on whether the common law action was sufficiently related to the federal act to warrant preemption.' 5 8 In fact, the court held that state laws which result in regulation of employee benefit plans, even indirectly, are
preempted. 9
Based on the disposition of preemption by New York courts regarding other federal acts, it is submitted that the New York
Court of Appeals would follow the rule developed prior to Dewey,
in which state law claims based on failure to warn were preempted
by the Act.' 60 In further support of this conclusion, it is noted
...Id. § 1144(c). "The term 'State law' includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or
other State action having the effect of law, of any State." Id.
'" See Planned Consumer Mktg., Inc. v. Coats And Clark, Inc., 71 N.Y.2d 442, 449-50,
522 N.E.2d 30, 34-35, 527 N.Y.S.2d 185, 190 (1988).
'"
See supra notes 97 and 101 and accompanying text (Dewey analysis of regulatory
effect).
...See Planned Consumer Mktg., 71 N.Y.2d at 449-50, 552 N.E.2d at 34-35, 527 N.Y.S.2d
at 189-90. The majority noted that "some state actions may affect employee benefit plans
in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates
to' the plan. Only State laws that purport to regulate, directly or indirectly, the terms and
conditions of employee benefit plans are preempted." Id. In Planned Consumer Mktg., the
five causes of action at issue involved New York Debtor and Creditor Law, Business Corporation Law and Estates Powers and Trusts Law, and therefore, were not preempted because the purpose of these state laws was to "inhibit the transfer of money in defraud of
creditors, not to assess or regulate employee benefit plans." Id. at 445, 552 N.E.2d at 32,
527 N.Y.S.2d at 187. See also Retail Shoe Health Comm'n v. Reminick, 62 N.Y.2d 173,
178, 464 N.E.2d 974, 976, 476 N.Y.S.2d 276, 278 (1984) (substance of claims against
ERISA trustees for liability due to breaches of fiduciary duties fell within scope and preemption of ERISA), cert. denied sub nom., Reminick v. Maltz, 471 U.S. 1022 (1985).
169 See Planned Consumer Mktg., 71 N.Y.2d at 450, 522 N.E.2d at 35, 527 N.Y.S.2d at
188. See also Sasso v. Vachris, 66 N.Y.2d 28, 32, 484 N.E.2d 1359, 1361, 494 N.Y.S.2d
856, 858 (1985) (term "relates to" as provided in ERISA's supersedure clause emcompasses
State laws that both directly and indirectly affect employee benefit plans). But see Dewey v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 121 N.J. 69, 89-90, 577 A.2d 1239, 1249 (1990) (preemption
of indirect regulation runs counter to analysis in Dewey).
100 See also 19 N.Y. Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws § 8 (1982). "[Tlhere can be no conflict of
authority ....
between a state and the United States .. . the former being always subordinated and the latter paramount. A state law which contravenes a valid law of the United
States is void." Id. It is hard to imagine what could be more contravening than a state law
which holds inadequate a warning label expressly provided by Congress to be adequate,
and further, imposes penalties for compliance with that federal label. See also Palmer v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 627 (lst Cir. 1987) (action under state law based on
faulure to warn would contravene Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act).
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that the New York State Constitution expressly recognizes the
power of the legislature to alter the common law.' 8 ' The Court of
Appeals has also held that the legislature may even abolish a common law right without providing a substitute remedy."8 2 It is asserted, that if a cigarette manufacturer had complied with a warning label mandated by the New York legislature, it would not have
had to pay compensatory damages based on inadequate warning
in a New York court. 3 It is submitted that Congress has in effect
replaced the authority of the state legislature on this issue. Therefore, an action in New York against a cigarette manufacturer,
based on the inadequacy of the warning label, will likely be
deemed abolished by the legislative Act of Congress.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it appears that the Dewey court's preemption analysis is faulty. The court disregards congressional intent to protect commerce and the national economy by focusing
on the states' traditional power in the area of health and welfare.
However, it is well settled that Congress may preempt both state
common and statutory law, pursuant to the supremacy clause.
When Congress enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act it exercised this power.
In addition, it is suggested that there would be no need for predictions, or for courts to struggle with "the ready arsenal[s] of the
canons of statutory construction,''4 if Congress would amend the
Act by adding a provision defining "State law," as it 'did in the
"'
See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 14. "Such parts of the common law, and of the act of the
legislature of the colony of New York, . . . shall be and continue the law of this state,
subject to such alterations as the legislature shall make concerning the same." Id.
16' See Fearon v.Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 271-75, 5 N.E.2d 815, 817 (1936) (abolishing
actions to recover damages for alienation of affections, criminal conversation, seduction
and breach of promise to marry). The Fearon court stated that "[t]he Legislature, . . .must
have in mind the general welfare .... If the subject is one within its jurisdiction, courts
may not pass upon the wisdom of its action and substitute their judgment for that of the
law making body." Id. at 273-74, 5 N.E.2d at 817. See also Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978) (Constitution does not require federal law
to "either duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a reasonable substitiute
remedy.").
163 See Dewey, 121 N.J. at 105, 577 A.2d at 1257 (Antell, P.J.A.D., dissenting) (Congressional ability to limit common law remedies).
164 Palmer, 825 F.2d at 623.
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Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of
1986. Finally, it is suggested that in the future Congress should be
aware of the need for clear expression in the area of preemption
and provide either a savings clause or a definition of "State law."
Such clarity is necessary because uniformity, often a primary goal
of preemption, should not be frustrated by conflicting interpretations in the courts.
Joseph M. Nador & Stacy J. Sussman
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